Time for Rumsfeld to goI have only a couple of points to make about the editorial. The first, and there has been some confusion on this point, is that the various Army/Navy etc. Times newspapers are not affiliated with the Defense Department or the US government. They're owned by Gannett, and thus are sister publications to USA Today. They are written by journalists, not soldiers, though some of the journalists used to be soldiers.
“So long as our government requires the backing of an aroused and informed public opinion ... it is necessary to tell the hard bruising truth.”
That statement was written by Pulitzer Prize-winning war correspondent Marguerite Higgins more than a half-century ago during the Korean War.
But until recently, the “hard bruising” truth about the Iraq war has been difficult to come by from leaders in Washington.
One rosy reassurance after another has been handed down by President Bush, Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “mission accomplished,” the insurgency is “in its last throes,” and “back off,” we know what we’re doing, are a few choice examples.
Military leaders generally toed the line, although a few retired generals eventually spoke out from the safety of the sidelines, inciting criticism equally from anti-war types, who thought they should have spoken out while still in uniform, and pro-war foes, who thought the generals should have kept their critiques behind closed doors.
Now, however, a new chorus of criticism is beginning to resonate. Active-duty military leaders are starting to voice misgivings about the war’s planning, execution and dimming prospects for success.
Army Gen. John Abizaid, chief of U.S. Central Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee in September: “I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I’ve seen it ... and that if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move towards civil war.”
Last week, someone leaked to The New York Times a Central Command briefing slide showing an assessment that the civil conflict in Iraq now borders on “critical” and has been sliding toward “chaos” for most of the past year. The strategy in Iraq has been to train an Iraqi army and police force that could gradually take over for U.S. troops in providing for the security of their new government and their nation.
But despite the best efforts of American trainers, the problem of molding a viciously sectarian population into anything resembling a force for national unity has become a losing proposition.
For two years, American sergeants, captains and majors training the Iraqis have told their bosses that Iraqi troops have no sense of national identity, are only in it for the money, don’t show up for duty and cannot sustain themselves.
Meanwhile, colonels and generals have asked their bosses for more troops. Service chiefs have asked for more money.
And all along, Rumsfeld has assured us that things are well in hand.
Now, the president says he’ll stick with Rumsfeld for the balance of his term in the White House.
This is a mistake. It is one thing for the majority of Americans to think Rumsfeld has failed. But when the nation’s current military leaders start to break publicly with their defense secretary, then it is clear that he is losing control of the institution he ostensibly leads.
These officers have been loyal public promoters of a war policy many privately feared would fail. They have kept their counsel private, adhering to more than two centuries of American tradition of subordination of the military to civilian authority.
And although that tradition, and the officers’ deep sense of honor, prevent them from saying this publicly, more and more of them believe it.
Rumsfeld has lost credibility with the uniformed leadership, with the troops, with Congress and with the public at large. His strategy has failed, and his ability to lead is compromised. And although the blame for our failures in Iraq rests with the secretary, it will be the troops who bear its brunt.
This is not about the midterm elections. Regardless of which party wins Nov. 7, the time has come, Mr. President, to face the hard bruising truth:
Donald Rumsfeld must go.
My second point is that the editorial's arguments are weak. They boil down to "We haven't won yet, and the Administration said we would win." Many of the statements the editorial makes, like "Rumsfeld has lost credibility with the uniformed leadership" or "colonels and generals have asked their bosses for more troops," are not supported by the facts supplied. In any event, as long time readers know, I firmly reject the "more troops" position. It wouldn't have helped before and it certainly wouldn't help now. The only solution now is for an Iraqi government (or three) to stand up and bring peace. (If Iraq were broken up, either de jure or just de facto, two of three parts would probably have peace, more or less, from day one.)
My concern at this point -- and it has little to do with Rumsfeld or the Iraqi war -- is that the remaking of the military Rumsfeld has been pushing, while attacked as extreme, has been so moderate. It has been almost 60 years since a real shake up of the Pentagon, and another is past due. Here are five ideas for really shaking up the military.
First, and with all due respect for Colonel Guinn, we need to abolish the Air Force. Air power is just artillery writ large, and it should be part of the Army. Pilots should have to serve with infantry units for promotion to field grade. Both the US and Israel have been ill-served by having Air Force officers at the top of their general staffs. It is time to return the infantry to the center of our military thought. Similarly, Marine aviation should be turned over to the Navy, but Naval Officers should have to put in a tour with the Marines just as Army pilots will have to serve with the infantry.
Second, there should be a professional General Staff separate from the Army and Navy. Officers should be seconded to the General Staff for tours of duty, during which they should wear uniforms distinct from their branch of service. The Chairman of the General Staff should always have a CIB.
Third, the Quartermasters for all the services should be centralized into a single corps, and perhaps privatized.
Fourth, all special forces should be incorporated into a single centralized command.
Fifth, we should engage in a thorough review of foreign bases with the presumption that they should all be abandoned. Only a clearly positive cost-benefit should be allowed to save any foreign base. US troops should not be kept in an area as a "trip-wire" so that when they are wiped out, we will be forced to respond.
As a bonus, and only because I am a conservative, I'd love to rename the Defense Department the War Department.
3 comments:
David:
I firmly reject the "more troops" position. It wouldn't have helped before and it certainly wouldn't help now.
Is precisely the sort of thing that causes me to hold your opinions in the highest esteem.
Unfortunately, you followed it up with this bit of blather:
Air power is just artillery writ large, and it should be part of the Army.
No. It. Is. Not.
Artillery exists to support the advance of ground troops, who are, by definition, at the periphery of the war. Air power can be used as artillery, or as a means to keep the enemy's air power off our artillery and troops, or, most importantly, used to attack the enemy's centers of gravity.
An Air Force subsumed to the Army's needs consists of nothing more than A-10s and F-15s, and would have limited ability conduct asymmetric warfare.
I don't mean to come across as an airpower fanatic. Rather, one of the greatest strengths of our military establishment has been competition among branches. Is such competition often wasteful? No doubt. But, like our economy, has any better means surfaced? Hardly.
Pilots should have to serve with infantry units for promotion to field grade.
It isn't a pre-req for field grade, but probably 30% of all combat pilots serve as ALOs (Air Liaison Officers) to Army units while Capts and Majors.
It is time to return the infantry to the center of our military thought.
Only if you want to conduct symmetric combat. About the only thing our adversaries are even remotely good at is infantry. I am happy to grant that once the issue has been forced, boots on the ground are indispensable for ensuring the issue remains forced. However, that discussion is best served by considering the conflict as two entirely different phases, the second of which the AF is wholly unsuited for.
Second, there should be a professional General Staff separate from the Army and Navy.
It has been done. Refer to Germany, ca 1915 and 1936.
Fifth, we should engage in a thorough review of foreign bases with the presumption that they should all be abandoned. Only a clearly positive cost-benefit should be allowed to save any foreign base. US troops should not be kept in an area as a "trip-wire" so that when they are wiped out, we will be forced to respond.
Very true. If only those cost - benefit assessments could be forced to yield clear cut results.
During the Cold War troops were in that position (along the IGB and Korea). Please discuss the effects of removing US Forces from the IGB on Soviet planning. After all, if such a move is smart now, why wouldn't it have been smart then?
At the moment, due to our asymmetric air power, I don't think any troops are "sacrificial".
As a bonus, and only because I am a conservative, I'd love to rename the Defense Department the War Department.
I think an aversion to euphemisms would be sufficient reason.
If shameless horn blowing causes flu like symptoms, then avert your eyes from the following.
I happened to write the Air Force's white paper on information warfare doctrine, Cornerstones of Information Warfare.
Skipper:
I thought you might have an opinion.
I'm certainly not suggesting that we get rid of bomber command or strategic air doctrine. But the Cold War structure just is not designed for the problems we currently face.
In Iraq, we certainly could have bombed their industrial base to rubble. We didn't, we wouldn't and we shouldn't have. In any war other than a total war, NATO v. Warsaw Pact conflict, we're simply not going to use our ability to flatten the other guy's infrastructure. In Iraq, we didn't even want to destroy all their bridges (an artillery like function), because soon enough we were going to need them. In Iraq style limited warfare, the part of airpower that's not like artillery is like calvary: to disrupt the flow of men and materiel behind enemy lines.
Now, who are our future enemies likely to be. They are, it seems to me, much more like Iraq than like WWII or the planned-for war against the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, to the extent we have a need to destroy civilian infrastructure and try for decapitating strikers, we're more likely to give the task to the Navy and use Tomahawks.
Given the nature of likely future conflicts, I'm puzzled by your statement that About the only thing our adversaries are even remotely good at is infantry. In Iraq, we're desperate to try to get them to stand up and fight an infantry battle. Any time they do so, we defeat them in detail. Our problem is with insurgency/guerilla tactics, against which air power, and particularly strategic air power, is almost useless.
Just because Germany used a professional General Staff, and my suggestion is based on the German model, doesn't mean that it's a bad idea. After all, Hitler was a vegetarian. Our problem is parochialism in the service branches (to the extent that the Marines have made it into a force multiplier). We have previously agreed that the Grenada invasion was a turning point for the services because, after some pretty bad botching there, promotion was made to depend, in part, on evaluations written up by other services. A seperate General Staff, which took officers from the services and then sent them back, would make the process even better.
Just as you don't want to come across as a air power fanatic, I don't want to come across as an air power hater. I'm not at all. The problem is just the opposite: the siren song of air power is just too darn inviting. Here's something that we are so good at and our enemies are so bad at that we are tempted to overly rely on it. Israel just ran head long into this wall, under an air force officer serving as senior military officer. We can bomb them with impunity, but (a) bombing leads to loss of sympathy and (b) in the end, bombing can't achieve victory. In a limited war, victory must come surgically. Both Saddam and Hezbollah managed to avoid decapitation strikers from the two most powerful air forces in the world. Saddam was caught by boots on the ground. Hezbollah was able to use Israel's bombing to win the war.
The information warfare paper is very interesting. I'll try to blog it, if I have the time.
David:
But the Cold War structure just is not designed for the problems we currently face.
The part of the CW structure that is unsuitable is our current overseas basing, South Korea in particular. (Although, it is worth noting that overseas bases provide significant power projection capabilities -- cargo aircraft can land for refueling, and tankers can much closer to refueling tracks, thereby increasing offload).
As the paper I wrote (but for which the SAF and CSAF get the credit) mentions, doctrine is driven by the nature of the realm within which the operations take place; that alone justifies three separate branches. Clearly, though, the services can't be blind to the fact that operations within one realm can have knock-on effects in other realms.
The CW did drive force structure, and it is to this which you may be referring. However, oddly enough, and no doubt fortuitously, many of the CW weapons systems have been ideally suited to the WOT, e.g. the B-52 and B-2.
The jury is still out on the F-22 and the F-35. I think the primary benefit of both, and particularly the F-22, is to set the air supremacy bar so high that no nation will attempt to counter it.
In Iraq style limited warfare, the part of airpower that's not like artillery is like calvary: to disrupt the flow of men and materiel behind enemy lines.
This is simply not true. Regardless of how limited (or not) the war, economy of force always applies. In the past, we bombed our opponents into rubble because that was the least expensive means of attaining our goals; we will never again do so, because it simply isn't necessary, and is almost always counterproductive. While Warden's book is over optimistic (it is, in part, an advocacy book), the central point remains: ground power, and air power in support of ground power, will always be working at the periphery of the conflict. Viewing air power as nothing other than artillery, or a means of interdiction, is to disregard its ability to attack strategic centers of gravity directly, or hold the enemy in thrall of that eventuality (as we did in Iraq Freedom).
Our problem is with insurgency/guerilla tactics, against which air power, and particularly strategic air power, is almost useless.
That is quite true, but you are talking about a different phase of the conflict. The insurgency became a problem after open hostilities ended, and presents a problem that has no easy solution. Not only is air power largely useless, so is ground power. I don't know what the solution to nihilistic sectarian violence is, but I doubt it lies in how we structure our armed forces.
Your reference to strategic (as opposed to tactical?) airpower is very dated. It must be at least ten years since the Air Force finally owned up to the futility of defining what was "strategic" vs. "tactical" (a futility I am confident you will, should you make the attempt, replicate). As a consequence, Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command disappeared, to be replaced by Air Combat Command.
Just because Germany used a professional General Staff, and my suggestion is based on the German model, doesn't mean that it's a bad idea.
The German General Staff was certainly responsible for WWI, and likely WWII. Consequently, tours in Washington are strictly limited to (IIRC) 4 years, with very high level approval required for any extension.
The existing requirement for a Joint tour (which, oddly enough, did not include my time commanding a Navy squadron), is, IMHO, the best available solution.
Parochialism is a problem, no doubt about it. But the only possible way to eliminate parochialism is to eliminate competition, and, along the way, come up with some successor(s) of our existing branches that no longer can be said to have a core competency.
Both Saddam and Hezbollah managed to avoid decapitation strikers from the two most powerful air forces in the world. Saddam was caught by boots on the ground. Hezbollah was able to use Israel's bombing to win the war.
Saddam was caught by boots, but long after we changed the regime. Air power, employed independently of ground force considerations, made that phase of the conflict astonishingly cheap. Once Saddam was deposed, the next phase of the conflict was simply not about him.
Hezbollah presented an entirely different problem, to which I doubt ground power offered any better solution, but that would have been bought at much higher cost. So long as politicians and opinion makers are, in general, willing to tolerate one side conducting combat operations amidst civilians, while excoriating any attack on those operations because of the civilian cost, then I, for one, have no idea what the solution is.
But here again, I don't think it lies in organization or tactics.
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