tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post2476563903802471075..comments2023-03-26T03:50:25.501-04:00Comments on David's Secret Blog: Assume A Can OpenerUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-85626353232992823882008-01-21T18:58:00.000-05:002008-01-21T18:58:00.000-05:00proves the possibility of G-d's existenceHow do yo...<I>proves the possibility of G-d's existence</I><BR/><BR/>How do you prove a possibility? Isn't that an oxymoron?Duckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08852569465893563139noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-3875763266998627932008-01-10T11:09:00.000-05:002008-01-10T11:09:00.000-05:00You're a materialist because you privilege one mat...You're a materialist because you privilege one material (carbon) over another (silicon).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-65908299893147225122008-01-10T08:24:00.000-05:002008-01-10T08:24:00.000-05:00Right neighborhood, wrong house.As I've said befor...Right neighborhood, wrong house.<BR/><BR/>As I've said before, I'm skeptical about the possibility of artificial consciousness. On the other hand, this is an interesting thought experiment that proves the possibility of G-d's existence.Davidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16902329503560660425noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-21588399278967019622008-01-10T07:19:00.000-05:002008-01-10T07:19:00.000-05:00Materialist!Gosh, I have waited years for that. Yo...Materialist!<BR/><BR/>Gosh, I have waited <EM>years</EM> for that. Yow!<BR/><BR/>P.S. This sounds a lot like an article I read in <EM>New Scientist</EM> a few weeks back about disembodied consciousnesses.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-59812871886715170402008-01-10T07:11:00.000-05:002008-01-10T07:11:00.000-05:00That's it.That's it.Davidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16902329503560660425noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-42918281380317366232008-01-10T01:48:00.000-05:002008-01-10T01:48:00.000-05:00I think I'm lost.David, it sounds like you're sayi...I think I'm lost.<BR/><BR/>David, it sounds like you're saying (in your last sentence) that the more consciousnesses you compute, the less likely it is that if you pick one a random that it's biologically based? It that it?Brethttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15063508651955739056noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-81983596751672504012008-01-09T23:28:00.000-05:002008-01-09T23:28:00.000-05:00By "real" I meant carbon based rather than silicon...By "real" I meant carbon based rather than silicon based.Davidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16902329503560660425noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32636283.post-75635109293417067662008-01-09T20:21:00.000-05:002008-01-09T20:21:00.000-05:00Further assumptions made that may not follow:1) Co...Further assumptions made that may not follow:<BR/><BR/>1) Computers could run multiple consciousnesses.<BR/><BR/>Unclear. It rather depends on the mechanism for creating consciousness. If it's a quantum process, as some theorize, then this may not be true.<BR/><BR/>2) That a sentient AI can be placed in to an arbitrary initial state.<BR/><BR/>It may be that we could no more understand the interrelated structure of AI's data than we can read a phenotype from a DNA sequence.<BR/><BR/>3) That sentient AIs in a simulation would be unable to detect that fact.<BR/><BR/>4) That social simulations do not suffer from the combinatorial communication problem.<BR/><BR/>It's very easy to simulate large numbers of objects. It's enormously harder to simulate their interactions. In the worst case, the number of interactions grows as the factorial of the number of objects, which is even faster than exponential growth. This would be a serious problem for any social experiment of the nature you're discussing.<BR/><BR/>Bogus conclusion:<BR/><BR/>That there is a difference between a "real" consciousness vs. a software one.<BR/><BR/>This contradicts your initial assumption, which is that the two are indistinguishable.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com